An officer does not need to see a weapon before acting to protect himself. Courts, along with furtive-gesture case law, have put it in four words: officers need not await the “glint of steel.”
By the time the steel shows, it is often too late.
That principle sits at the center of furtive-gesture case law. Courts judge force from the officer’s perspective at the moment of decision, not from what investigators find afterward. A hand moving toward a bulge, an arm pinned to the side while running, a knife raised after repeated commands: each can make force reasonable before an attack begins.
The principle has limits, though. Courts credit specific, observable behavior in context. They do not credit a vague claim that someone made a “furtive movement.”
The glint-of-steel case: Estate of Larsen v. Murr (10th Cir. 2008)
The Tenth Circuit held that a Denver officer acted reasonably when he shot a man who raised a large knife and stepped toward him. The court affirmed summary judgment for the officer and the city.
What happened
Shortly after midnight on April 15, 2003, Lyle Larsen called 911 and threatened to kill someone or himself. Officers Randy Murr and David Brase found him alone on his front porch, holding a knife with a blade over a foot long. Murr first thought it was a pipe; Brase thought it looked like a small sword.
Brase identified himself and ordered Larsen to put the knife down. Larsen bent as if to set it down, then stood back up still holding it. He raised the knife above his shoulder, blade out, and turned toward Murr. Murr ordered him to drop it several times, the last time warning he would shoot. Larsen took a step toward Murr, who fired twice and killed him. The distance was disputed, somewhere between 7 and 20 feet.
What the court said
The court restated the core rule from Graham v. Connor: force is judged from the officer’s on-scene perspective, not with hindsight. Even a reasonable but mistaken belief can justify the force used. Then it added the line this case is known for: a reasonable officer need not await the “glint of steel” before acting.
The court also set out four factors for judging the threat from an armed subject. Courts in the Tenth Circuit still call them the Larsen factors:
- Whether officers ordered the subject to drop the weapon, and whether he complied.
- Whether the subject made hostile motions with the weapon toward officers.
- The distance between the officers and the subject.
- The subject’s manifest intentions.
The court then listed 11 undisputed facts that, taken together, made the shooting reasonable. They included the 911 threat, the late hour, the size of the knife, at least four ignored commands, Larsen’s position on higher ground, the raised blade, and the step toward Murr.
The arguments that failed
- Distance. The estate argued the gap may have been 20 feet. The court refused to treat any distance as decisive; it is one factor among many. Denver’s training taught that a knife within 21 feet is an imminent threat.
- Barriers. A retaining wall, stairs and a railing stood between them. The court said the high ground could help an attack as easily as hinder it.
- No lunge. The estate said Larsen never lunged or stabbed. The court said raising the knife and stepping toward the officer after repeated commands was hostile enough.
Where the phrase came from
The “glint of steel” language did not start in Larsen. It comes from New York courts deciding when officers could act on a suspected concealed weapon, beginning with People v. Benjamin (N.Y. 1980), a waistband case. Larsen cited a later New York decision, People v. Morales (1993), and carried the idea from stop-and-frisk law into deadly force.
Two cases where no weapon was seen at all
Larsen involved a visible knife. Two other cases push the principle further: the officer never saw a weapon before firing.
Anderson v. Russell (4th Cir. 2001): the hand toward the bulge
In December 1991, an officer working security at a Maryland mall got an in-person tip that a man had a gun in his waistband. The officer saw a bulge there consistent with a handgun. He followed the man outside to reduce the risk to shoppers. Officers drew their weapons and ordered him to raise his hands.
Anderson raised his hands, then lowered them toward the bulge without explanation. He later said he was reaching to turn off a Walkman. The officer fired three times. Anderson was unarmed; the bulge was an eyeglass case.
A jury found the force excessive. The Fourth Circuit reversed and entered judgment for the officer. The tip plus the officer’s own sighting of a gun-shaped bulge made it reasonable to believe Anderson was armed. Lowering his hands toward that spot, against commands, made the threat immediate. The court refused to second-guess the officer with armchair alternatives like taking cover.
Argueta v. Jaradi (5th Cir. 2023): the pinned arm
After a stop, a driver ran on foot. He swung only his left arm. His right arm stayed pressed to his side, out of the officer’s view. The officer fired twice within about five seconds, without a warning.
The Fifth Circuit held that running with one arm pinned and hidden was a furtive gesture comparable to reaching for a waistband. Whether the officer actually saw the gun did not change the outcome. Several judges objected when the full court declined to rehear the case, so the holding is contested.
Where courts draw the line
The glint-of-steel principle is not a blank check. Larsen itself explained why two earlier Tenth Circuit knife cases went the other way and had to go to a jury.
| Case | What the officer faced | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Estate of Larsen v. Murr(10th Cir. 2008) | Foot-long knife raised overhead, four ignored commands, step toward officer, 7–20 ft | Force reasonable as a matter of law |
| Anderson v. Russell (4th Cir. 2001) | Gun tip, gun-shaped bulge, hands lowered toward it against commands, about 10 ft | Force reasonable; jury verdict reversed |
| Argueta v. Jaradi (5th Cir. 2023) | Fleeing on foot, right arm pinned and hidden, gun not seen | Force reasonable; contested on rehearing |
| Zuchel v. Spinharney (10th Cir. 1989) | Disputed whether he held a weapon (fingernail clippers), made a stabbing motion, or was warned | Fact questions; no summary judgment |
| Walker v. City of Orem(10th Cir. 2006) | Two-inch blade held to his own wrist, over 21 ft, no warnings, not facing officers, known suicidal | Fact questions; no summary judgment |
The pattern is consistent. Force held up when the record showed specific behavior directed at the officer, after commands, at a distance that made it dangerous. It went to a jury when the behavior was disputed, the weapon was doubtful, the subject was not oriented toward officers, or no warning was given.
Two cautions follow. Even Argueta‘s supporters treat it as fact-sensitive; other circuits look harder at claims of a “furtive” movement. And warnings still matter: give one when it is feasible.
What it means for articulation and FOCUS
These cases were won on details. The officers described exactly what they saw, in order. That is the habit FOCUS trains.
- Describe the behavior, not the label. “Furtive movement” invites a fight in court. “At 22:14, after ‘hands up,’ he lowered his right hand toward the right waistband where I observed a bulge” mirrors what Anderson credited.
- Show the sequence. Command, non-compliance, movement toward the weapon or the officer. Every case that held up had that order.
- Name the context. The Larsen factors read like FOCUS amplifiers and mitigators: weapon information, distance, terrain, warnings, and whether the subject’s movement was directed at officers.
- Stack the facts. Larsen rested on 11 facts, not one. A single cue rarely carries the case; a cluster does.
The FOCUS Risk Index (Indicators + Amplifiers) is built to capture exactly this. It does not replace the Graham standard. It gives officers a structured way to show the court the totality they faced before the glint of steel.
Cases cited
- Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2008)
- Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2001)
- Argueta v. Jaradi, 86 F.4th 1084 (5th Cir. 2023)
- People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267 (N.Y. 1980)
- People v. Morales, 198 A.D.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
- Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989)
- Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
This article is for training and education, not legal advice. Check current law in your jurisdiction.